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INTRODUCTION
Do methods of dispute resolution, such as mediation and negotiation
that seek an accommodation rather than a formal zero-sum solution,
render justice? This is a major theoretical and operational question
raised by the increasing use of alternatives to formal methods of dispute
resolution (ADR).1 In this Article I explore the use of the underlying
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Article draws its factual background from my work at the U.S. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, which I chaired between 1977 and 1981. I am especially grateful to
Barbara Babcock and Robert Delgado, who generously read this Article on short notice.
They cannot be charged with its shortcomings, but they must be credited with insights that
deepened my thinking. I am also grateful for the careful and patient research assistance of
Leigh Feldman. Sonia Lemmer was also helpful.
i. The classic "alternatives" are used far more often than litigation and courts. These
methods include negotiation among parties to settle their own dispute, perhaps the oldest
and- most widespread, and methods which use neutrals such as mediation (third party acts
as facilitator to help parties reach a decision); arbitration (third party selected by agree-
ment of parties or law to resolve dispute); and conciliation (third party helps reduce ten-
sions and explore solutions where parties have not agreed to resolve their differences). See
REPORT BY THE AD Hoc PANEL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION , PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS 36-38 (1983) [hereinafter NIDR Report]. However, an increas-
ing number of new methods have excited interest and have resulted in greater uses of
alternatives. Among the new methods are summary- jury trials (evidence summarized
before a jury is basis for probable verdict used by counsel to reach settlement); and mini-
trials (matter argued in summary fashion by counsel before parties, who then attempt set-
tlement). See D. Green, Recent Developments in Alternative Dispute Resolution, Remarks
at the First Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (May 20, 1983), reprinted in 100 F.R.D. 499, 515-20 (1983). New meth-
ods in turn are leading to further innovations. See W. URY, J. BRaT & S. GOLDBERG,
GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COST OF CONFLICT
(1988) [hereinafter W. URY, GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED]. (discussion. of grievance medi-
ation, in which after mediation fails, arbitrator hears brief presentation of case and offers
oral advisory opinion to encourage settlement).
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interests of the parties as a way to evaluate whether some alternative
systems render justice.'
An interest-based approach to resolving disputes is an exercise in prob-
lem solving that seeks to remove unnecessary conflict by focusing on the
underlying interests rather than the ostensible positions of the parties.'
In appropriate cases an interest analysis may afford a way to evaluate
justice as a function of outcomes instead of process.
Many traditional systems rely largely on rigorous procedures and deci-
sions by neutrals or by jurors to justify the fairness of their results. How-
ever, assessments of justice that rest on the strength or integrity of pro-
cedural protection prejudge and condemn all but formal dispute
resolution methods. ADR, on the other hand, may be legitimately chal-
lenged as potentially unfair because these methods do not use all the
traditional procedural safeguards."
Thus far, methodological issues have blocked study of issues of justice
arising from varying dispute resolution methods and systems. The reality
that dispute resolution devices differ in the procedural protection they
afford necessitates a search for criteria other than regularity of process
by which to evaluate them. Interests are necessarily subjective; but they
allow an investigation and comparison across at least some fundamen-
tally different dispute methods, negotiation and mediation, for example.
As I seek to demonstrate in this Article, criteria for uncovering interests
can be developed; and interests can be tested and subjected to analysis to
test their validity as criteria for judging the fairness of outcomes. In view
of the rapid spread of ADR, the question of how to compare alternatives
to formal dispute mechanisms with those that provide formal protection
must be pursued.
The assortment of methods that have begun to proliferate as alterna-
tives to courts and other formal processes are likely to achieve the status
2. 1 am using "justice" to mean outcomes that are fair to all the parties to a dispute in
light of the facts and the equities surrounding the dispute. See infra text accompanying
notes 39-53.
3. See R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES; W. URY. GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED,
supra note 1. Although interest-oriented bargaining is a common form of negotiation, its
structure and rationale have attracted special and wide-spread attention because of the
work of Fisher and Ury. They have analyzed and popularized "standard based" or "princi-
pled" negotiation, a form of integrative or problem-solving, cooperative bargaining, as an
alternative to distributive, positional negotiation. The authors press interest-oriented negoti-
ations over zero-sum approaches, such as the determination of rights by courts or the exer-
cise of power through conflicts, such as strike. or war. Whether interest-oriented ap-
proaches may in some cases be preferable because of the fairness or justice of the results is
the question I address in this Article.
4. See Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee, & Hubert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359; Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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of dispute systems rather than simply dispute methods.5 If so, two ques-
tions will arise. Can alternative systems achieve the structural integrity
and coherence associated with formal justice systems? Are efficient alter-
native systems preferable to formal systems that have become highly
inefficient or nonfunctional? These questions necessarily implicate issues
of fundamental fairness. New systems are unlikely to be fully accepted
unless they are regarded as adequate mechanisms for rendering justice.
Discussion of the fairness of ADR to the parties has been largely ab-
stract because of the absence of a base of information. Thus to concre-
tize my thinking, I use the example of the redesign of the complaint
processing system at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) during the years 1977 to 1981 because the issues that I raise in
this Article had to be confronted in that effort.6
Part I of this Article discusses the limitations and obsolescence of
many traditional dispute systems and the uncharted change toward
greater use of alternatives. Part II questions the notion that nonfunc-
tional formal systems render justice and then discusses the EEOC case
processing reform and its conceptual basis. Part III offers an example of
how an interest analysis can assist in evaluating the justice issues raised
by an informal dispute system and encourages a further search for ways
to evaluate whether formal and informal systems render justice.
I. BEYOND OLD AND NEW ASSUMPTIONS
At a time when the law is beset by enormous unattended problems of
process,' there is little of the radical criticism these process problems
5. See Ray & Clare, The Multi-Door Courthouse Idea: Building the Courthouse of the
Fpiture, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON Dis. REs. 7 (1985); Edelman, Institutionalizing Dispute Alterna-
tives, 9 JUST. SYs. J. 134 (1984). See also W. URY. GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED, supra
note 1. In using underlying interests in a discussion of dispute systems, Ury and his col-
leagues build on Getting to Yes, supra note 3, which Ury co-authored with Roger Fisher,
and adopt its core concepts, its skills-building orientation, and the simple, cloar language
that gave the Fisher and Ury book a broad audience. The common conceptual bond be-
tween the two books is a focus on the parties' underlying interests, which when probed,
may lead to a mutual posture of problem-solving rather than to adversarial positioning.
6. The EEOC administers Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act, and § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, all as
amended. The reforms discussed in this Article were developed when the EEOC had re-
sponsibility only for Title VII- of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, but later were
applied to its other statutory responsibilities as well. After examining the reforms and their
results, Congress transferred the additional job discrimination responsibilities from other
federal agencies to the EEOC in the Civil Rights Reorganization Act of 1978.
. 7. For example, in the federal district courts, the pending civil caseload averaged 345
cases per authorized judgeship in 1979 compared to 425 in the equivalent representative
year, 1988, despite an increase in the number of dispositions and a decrease in the number
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
might be expected to attract. Instead the profession retains an appetite
for procedural formalism8 that is at odds with often dramatic substantive
changes with which the law has been identified in recent decades.9 Law-
yers, of course, are understandably at home with lawyer-dominated
processes that facilitate their mandatory advocacy role in the representa-
tion of clients and that, incidentally, enhance the power and control of
lawyers. They are less comfortable---or familiar-with processes that re-
duce the complexity, time, and cost of resolving disputes and that, inci-
dentally, often increase the autonomy of clients. The legal culture, with
traditional justice systems at its center, leaves many lawyers with the
suspicion that efficiency and justice are incompatible.
Nevertheless, as courts strangle on their own processes and formalism
escalates,' 0 lawyers and judges increasingly are turning to alternatives to
courts and other traditional processes."' This is as close as the law has
come to institutional innovation, and it has been accompanied by little
thinking about underlying theories of justice. Rather, the incentive to use
new dispute resolution approaches has developed out of pressures to re-
lieve the congestion that courts experience and the costs that clients pro-
of judgeship vacancies-32 in 1988 and 28 in 1980. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1970; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1981; REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1988.
The Senate Judiciary Committee recently commissioned a study of ways to reduce the
costs and delays that attend federal litigation. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, JUSTICE FOR
ALL: REDUCING COST AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989).
8. The litigation and formal filings generated by Rule I I of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are an indication of the resiliency of formalism. Enacted to prevent frivolous
filings and litigation, the rule appears to have encouraged more litigation than it has pre-
vented. Boilerplate Rule I 1 sanction motions, motions against attorneys who have filed
Rule II motions, appeals from awards, and ancillary proceedings to determine appropriate
sanctions are now common and increasing. See Note, Has a Kafkaesque Dream Come
True? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: Time for Another Amendment?, 67 B.U.L.
REV. 1019 (1987).
9. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state supported ra-
cially segregated schools violate the 14th Amendment); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1963) (importance of debate on public issues justifies requirement of "actual
malice" before a public official may recover for libel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1964) (constitutional right of privacy interpreted from amendments 1, 3, 4, and 5).
10. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), in which the
Supreme Court replaced a straight-forward method of proof in job discrimination cases
with requirements that will encourage costly depositions and litigation to uncover the nec-
essary facts.
11. For example, the D.C. Superior Court, the trial court for the District of Columbia,
cooperates with the D.C. Bar to hold settlement weeks periodically, during which lawyers
help other lawyers to settle pending cases. Recently, of 703 cases in which mediation was
attempted, 43 % were settled and more than 80 % of the participating attorneys were satis-
fied with the process and found it to be useful. THE WASHINGTON LAWYER, Oct. 1989, at
9.
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test, or in the average individual's case, simply cannot afford. 12 Just as
often, parties in other settings, such as jobs where disputes must be re-
solved, are turning from the traditional methods of those settings, such
as arbitration.' 3
The new interventions are often innovative but ad hoc methods of reso-
lution"4 adopted to augment or replace more formal methods perceived
to be ineffective or overburdened. Even small changes in the way dis-
putes are resolved may have potentially vast and perhaps unforeseeable
consequences, however. The possibility that courts may become only one
of several options officially encouraged to resolve disputes represents an
unprecedented departure in the justice system, the coisequences of
which have not been thought through. In labor relations as well, changes
in the traditional methods used to resolve union grievances can affect
larger issues: perceptions of the justice of results and thus of the effec-
tiveness of unions as representatives; the frequency and causes of strikes;
the size of union treasuries as well as the cost of union dues, which bear
part of the cost of arbitration; and ultimately the strength of unions
themselves, at a time when union representation is as likely to depend on
the tangible benefits it produces as on worker ideology or conscious-
ness. 5 Whether in justice systems, labor relations, or other settings,
those who develop new systems inevitably will have to account for such
deeper questions, and not only for the more obvious and pressing issues
of efficiency. At the same time, the procedural protections associated
with formal dispute systems do not support the notion that severe ineffi-
ciency should be tolerated because, in the end, the parties are better off
than they would have been in less formal systems.
12. Although the United States has the greatest number of lawyers in the world and the
highest rate per capita, 95% of legal services are provided to only about I % of the popula-
tion. See NIDR Report, supra note I, at 8.
13. Arbitration is far less formal than litigation but over the years often has taken on
the trappings of a legal proceeding. The rising cost of arbitration is attributed to "legal-
isms," especially the use of transcripts and post-hearing briefs. See Responses to Costly,
Litigious Arbitrations Assessed by Speakers at ABA Annual Meeting, 160 Daily Lab. R.
A-7 (Aug. 21, 1989). See also Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances under a Collective
Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. L. REV. 270 (1982); W. URY,
GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED, supra note 1.
14. See supra note I.
15. Unions, which have steadily lost membership, are at 16.8% of the workforce today
compared with 30% twenty years ago. Polls of nonunion employees in major corporations
indicate that most feel that they do not need a union. In contrast, unions have been grow-
ing among service workers whose pay and benefits are low. See Risen, Unions' Future
Questioned After Summer of Setbacks, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at 6, col. I;
Siegal, Labor Must Face Changing Society, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 2, 1989, at I1.
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II. THE CALCULUS OF JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY: A CASE STUDY
A. Justice: The Need for Evaluation
How overburdened and inefficient must a system for resolving disputes
become before it is open to question on the ground that it may no longer
dispense justice? Are courts and other traditional mechanisms merely
inefficient when they allow their processes to be sequestered for bouts of
adversarial combat that may force an inequitable settlement on the party
least able to tolerate the financial or human costs of lengthy litigation, or
when traditional systems make litigants wait for years to be heard or to
obtain a resolution? These and similar questions raise issues of enormous
difficulty, but as ADR increasingly replaces more formal methods, such
questions must be faced. The assumption that traditional justice mecha-
nisms produce a quality of justice superior to that of other modes of
resolution because of the panoply of procedural safeguards is untested.
This is partly because no means have been developed to evaluate whether
formal or informal systems in fact produce fair outcomes; partly because
no attempts have been made to test whether procedural safeguards cause
just outcomes; and partly because formal systems are simply assumed to
render justice.
Of course, procedural rigor is meant to avoid the question of the fair-
ness of outcomes. Procedural fairness substitutes for inevitably subjective
ideas of what constitutes substantive justice. I do not suggest that evalu-
ation of the outcomes of formal or informal systems is necessarily the
way to test the extent to which all are effective in rendering justice.
However, dependence on procedural safeguards at trial, such as the right
to cross-examine and adherence to the rules of eviderce, are inadequate
and often irrelevant responses to long delays, procedural complexity, and
high costs that put formal systems out of reach or alter or dilute results
that might have been different if these same systems had functioned effi-
ciently. Because they are deliberately process-based, traditional dispute
systems, particularly courts, may avoid the question of the fairness of
outcomes. What is unavoidable, at least for mechanisms that are dys-
functional, is skepticism concerning the results produced under such
conditions.
The indispensable need for the formalities and safeguards associated
with traditional justice systems is hardly open to argument. Functionally
adequate formal justice systems need neither defense nor- justification.
Every day that they are used they demonstrate anew that formal justice
is synonymous with due process. Nevertheless, modern disputes and the
new pressures that they generate demand that appropriate ways be found
to evaluate the quality of justice dispensed not only by new dispute
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methods but by old ones, whose structural characteristics should not im-
munize them from scrutiny. This need is especially pressing today when
so many courts and other traditional systems are overwhelmed not only
by the number of matters filed but by a complexity never envisioned
when these institutions were established.
16
Instead of being evaluated, however, traditional systems continue to be
tolerated, whatever their results and however obsolete these systems ap-
pear. There is still too little evidence even that a crisis of process in fact
stimulates reform.
At the EEOC, however, I found a crisis that ran so deep and had
become so public'7 that restructuring seemed to me to be the only viable
solution. The Commission's burgeoning caseload and sophisticated statu-
tory framework had outgrown the old-fashioned complaint process pat-
terned on systems used by state and local civil rights agencies since the
first ones were established in the 1940's.'1 The Commission's 125,000
case backlog and two-year time frame to resolve a simple complaint
made a mockery of the formal administrative process, adopted by the
Congress as an alternative to courts in order to speed resolutions and
encourage conciliation. The original purpose to provide a way to resolve
cases that was faster, less costly, more efficient, and less adversarial than
litigation had long since been defeated. Backlogged cases and slow
processing time were so entrenched that some rights organizations openly
advised complainants against filing at the EEOC.
In a 1976 report, the General Accounting Office of Congress' 9 found
that the average time to process small individual complaints at the
EEOC was two years, with some requiring seven years. Most charges
16. For example, the rapid development of mass torts has brought new and difficult
pressures on courts to accommodate large numbers of claims against a single defendant
within formal systems which normally require individualized due process protection. See
Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 779 (1985);
P. SCHUCK. AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986).
17. I suspect that one of the reasons that courts do not encounter more pressure for
reform is that, although they are public bodies, the effects of system breakdown is clear
mostly in discrete cases while the aggregate breakdown is not captured easily and dramati-
cally enough to garner the public outrage that is often necessary to spur wholesale reform.
In contrast, by the time I arrived at the EEOC, its backlog was perhaps the best known
fact about the agency and one for which it had been widely and publicly criticized.
18. However, the EEOC lacks the power to hold adversary hearings and issue orders. Its
formal process features are a traditional investigation relying chiefly on interrogatories and
demands for documents and a formal finding of cause or no cause to believe that discrimi-
nation exists; followed by conciliation in cause cases and the possibility of a de novo trial in
federal district court, brought by the Commission or private parties, not only in cases
where conciliation fails but also in no cause cases.
19. The data that follows here is drawn from GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION HAS MADE LIMITED PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 7 (Sept. 28, 1976).
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were closed administratively, usually because the long wait had fore-
closed any enforcement action or because the complainant could not be
found or no longer desired to pursue a case that was so old. For cases
that survived the wait, age had robbed most of their chances for reme-
dies. Despite a statutory requirement to conciliate cases,20 only eleven
percent were settled, and a complainant had a probability of only one in
thirty-three of obtaining a settlement in the year in which the case was
filed. These and other inefficiencies of the case processing system had
become notorious. Less often discussed was whether a system so clogged
and dysfunctional could render justice.21
Redesign of a dispute system to include informal features necessarily
raises the question of whether there will be a loss of rights. Whatever
their shortcomings, systems that are controlled by neutrals, that provide
procedural protection, and that follow precedents, reduce the effects of
naked power that otherwise might determine or influence outcomes. Nev-
ertheless, today formal systems have earned harsh criticism from both
users and the public, who figure in the calculation of justice, costs and
procedures that prohibit or limit access, lost opportunities, and the death
of a matter from age caused by delay and decay.
In a society of increasing complexity in which there are daunting pres-
sures on dispute systems, many that operate as they have for decades or
even centuries, the simple distinction between justice and efficiency is
artificial. We know much more about the efficiency of dispute systems,
both formal and informal, than we do about the quality of the justice
they produce. We are too sanguine that justice has been done because
due process has not been violated.
B. The Challenge of Systematic Reform
Rethinking entire dispute systems is still rare. In the law, such re-
thinking would require a departure from the professional orthodoxy that
courts invariably guarantee the best justice. When formal systems are
palpably inefficient and exasperating and work visible hardship on users,
this faith is not warranted. Yet not until system breakdown occurs or is
20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(0(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
21. The best evidence that the system did not render justice was the near absence of
remedies. A remedy-bearing process is not necessarily a just process, because it cannot be
assumed that those who file should necessarily prevail. However, little more than ten years
after the statute became effective, an 11 % remedy rate for individual complainants ap-
peared low. The fact that the remedy rate was subsequently raised substantially is some
indication that the old process was unjustly denying remedies. See infra notes 43-49 and
accompanying text. See also infra note 39.
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imminent does change occur, if then. Although the formal process may
be demonstrably ineffective or even nonfunctional, too often it continues
to be used as if no other alternatives were conceivable.
Reform of a traditional dispute system does not usually eliminate its
formal features, including the usual safeguards. Typically dispute system
reform adds less formal, voluntary options, supplementing rather than
replacing formal methods.22 Affording a choice among methods of reso-
lution adds options that may better suit some matters and enhances the
autonomy of clients or other users to decide how they would prefer that
the results be reached.2" It is difficult to argue against increasing the
choices people have for deciding their disputes,2 especially when many
traditional systems are so clearly fatigued and inadequate.
At the EEOC severe inefficiency amounting to a breakdown in the
case processing system itself encouraged significant modifications. A
three-step procedure placed at the beginning of the existing traditional
complaint system consisted of an extensive professional intake interview,
a fact-finding conference, and, where appropriate, a settlement attempt.
This expeditious process, called Rapid Charge Processing (RCP), in-
serted at the front end of the process, most often avoided the need to
turn to its more formal, traditional features, consisting of a more ex-
tended investigation and a formal finding. Most cases filed at the EEOC
were small individual complaints for which RCP was well suited.
22. See D. GREEN, S. GOLDBERG. & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 8-9 (1985).
?4oreover, even mandatory alternatives, such as court-ordered arbitration, allow appeal of
the decision or recourse to the usual formal process. See Court Ordered Arbitration Issue,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM 3 (Aug. 1985).
23. This choice is no small matter because of the complexity of the motives for pressing
disputes. For example, a supplier may want to continue doing business with a regular cus-
tomer who is temporarily behind in its payments and therefore may be reluctapt to bring a
formal case in court. At the same time, the supplier wants to be paid and may find that the
situation is best pursued through one of several alternatives to a lawsuit. A court decision
may be the least desirable option even when the parties have pressed litigation to decide
important matters of public concern. Two weeks before scheduled argument in Turnock v.
Ragsdale, Doc. No. 88-79 (1988) before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Illinois attorney
general, reportedly because of public attitudes that now favor fewer restrictions on abor-
tion, negotiated a settlement with the American Civil Liberties Union, which feared fur-
ther limitations on the right to abortion announced in Roe v. Wade, 401 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Wilkerson, Illinois Case on Abortion Settled. Averting Supreme Court Action, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 23, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
24. Most forms of dispute resolution, such as negotiation and mediation, require that
both parties agree to the mode of resolution, while in court cases, one party-the landlord
in a landlord-tenant case, for example-may unilaterally initiate the mode of resolution.
Since the formal process usually remains an available option in any case, presumably the
weaker party may go on to use it if he chooses, or may use its availability to increase his
leverage in the informal process. This calculation can work in favor of a stronger party as
well, but no more so than if a court suit is the only option.
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By committing to the same process complaints that were simple and
comprehensive, small and large, individual and class, the old complaint
mechanism had been unable to allocate its resources rationally or to ad-
just its methodology intelligently. Staff spent enormous amounts of time
pursuing individual complaints that they hoped might develop into class
actions, almost always without success and almost always distracting
time and attention from the individual's complaint until it was too late
for either a successful finding or a settlement. At the same time, the
Commission had no systematic way to develop class complaints.
The new process introduced functional differentiation matched to case
type. RCP addressed only current and typical, small, individual com-
plaints while the Commission developed two additional systems, one for
processing class actions and another for eliminating the existing backlog
of cases.25 Because RCP received all new cases as of a designated start-
ing date for the new system, it enabled the Commission to break the
cycle that had guaranteed that each case would be old before it was
processed because it had been placed at the rear of a large backlog. RCP
for all new cases enabled the Commission to bring itself current, using a
new processing method while giving specialized, focused attention to the
backlog through a different process, a special Backlog Charge Processing
System that committed the agency to a systematic reduction of the back-
log. 26 This functional differentiation was conceived not only as a rational
design for the administrative complaint process; it was a response to per-
haps the most important lesson from the EEOC's own history-that one
generic and unrefined system was not suitable for all kinds of matters.
Although settlement for appropriate cases was contemplated, RCP
added a new system, not simply an alternative method to the existing
process. The three distinct components-professional intake interview,
fact-finding conference, and settlement procedure-like the parts of a
car, were designed to function together.
The new system was based on a major assumption of the conciliation
model on which the EEOC as well as state and local discrimination
agencies are based: that the public policy to eliminate discrimination
gives complainants and respondents compatible if dissimilar interests in a
discrimination dispute. Complainants desire timely remedies. Respon-
dents want to avoid liability but understand its inevitability in many
25. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
26. A separate staff was assigned to older cases in order to afford them specialized treat-
ment and to reduce the inventory. Case managers and supervisors closely supervised these
cases, including laying out the steps to be taken to resolve each case. Staff contacted charg-
ing parties to determine their availability and desire to proceed, and to seek additional case
information. A settlement attempt or extended investigation in appropriate cases followed.
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cases, and thus put a premium on reducing transaction costs, including
time taken from their work to navigate the process. The public policy
interests of a discrimination agency are consistent with those of both par-
ties. The EEOC needed a timely process that would allow it to more
effectively carry out the policy of the statute to eliminate discrimination.
These interests of the Commission, the complainant, and the respon-
dent required an intervention that would avoid the long processing time
required by the formal process while assuring that remedies would not be
foreclosed in the name of efficiency. To meet these needs, the new system
had to be remedy-oriented and expeditious. For the Commission, the
remedy orientation of the new process was indispensable to its credibility
because a remedy focus assured that RCP would be driven by justice
considerations, not mere efficiency in disposing expeditiously of com-
plaints. For complainants, the remedy focus acted as a quality control on
settlement. For respondents who agreed to concessions, settlement pro-
vided both savings in transaction costs and the avoidance of a possible
formal finding of discrimination.
At the center of RCP was a fact-finding process for early and unim-
peded discovery of the essential facts. Because it was fact-oriented, RCP
began with a professional intake interview like that performed by a law-
yer when interviewing a client, replacing the mere docketing of the bare
facts of a complaint by clerical employees. Professional investigators at
intake were able to capture valuable and perhaps irretrievable informa-
tion that might otherwise have been forgotten or lost, such as the names
and addresses of witnesses. Extensive intake interviews typically took the
Commission a considerable distance into the investigation itself, saving
investigation time, efficiently uncovering facts while memories were
fresh, and avoiding the destruction or loss of documentary evidence that
sometimes occurs with the postponement of its retrieval.
Professionalized intake also linked justice with efficiency in an impor-
tant way unrelated to the EEOC's investigation of cases. Many individu-
als who sought help at the EEOC had complaints that were not statutory
discrimination matters. For example, a Hispanic complainant might wish
to file a complaint against a large developer; an interview might reveal
that the complainant was a tenant and not an employee and that this
was therefore a landlord-tenant dispute. A black male might come in to
file a discrimination complaint against his black male supervisor; the in-
terview at intake, noting that both were from the same racial group,
might reveal that the two had a history of personal disagreements not
based on race. When clericals simply docketed complaints, large num-
bers of nonjurisdictional charges or matters inappropriate for a discrimi-
nation agency came into the system and took their places in the backlog
until months or even years later. Many individuals lost the opportunity
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for relief or had it delayed to their detriment, needlessly waiting out
their time in the EEOC backlog. With RCP, professionals at intake, in-
stead of accepting charges indiscriminately, counselled individuals imme-
diately so that if a charge did not belong at the EEOC, the individual
could be directed to where help was available. Thus, beginning at intake,
the system sought justice for individuals by matching them with the ap-
propriate vehicles for resolving their matters. At the same time, com-
plaints that required other treatment did not delay complainants whose
cases were appropriate for investigation under Title VII. Simultaneously,
efficiency was served because a dramatic reduction in nonjurisdictional
and other charges inappropriate for a discrimination process no longer
came into the system.2 7
The second step in RCP was the fact-finding conference, the heart of
the new process. Using the intake interview, an investigator prepared an
interrogatory and forwarded it to the employer. The employer was sum-
moned to appear, usually within a month, with her books and records.
The Commission thus avoided the long periods of delay that accompa-
nied more passive, traditional investigatory procedures. The fact-finding
conference was a practical alternative to more sedentary paper investiga-
tions commonly used by complaint-taking agencies that allow respon-
dents to effectively control the pace of the investigation and leave many
openings for delay to avoid producing the necessary records and other
evidence. Passive investigation techniques commonly used by government
agencies depend heavily on communication through written demands for
documents. The inevitable resistance to these demands occasionally led
to laborious on-site visits to sift through records.2 The same information
now came out in one or two fact-finding conferences. With proactive
fact-finding, the initiative and control remained with the Commission,
and the facts got out faster, more extensively, and more forthrightly than
they had previously during months of traditional processing.
The third step in the new process was a settlement attempt in appro-
priate cases, leaving the formal system of extended investigation and a
finding of cause or no cause for more complicated cases. It is the fact-
finding conference followed by the settlement attempt that most directly
raises the justice issues inherent in ADR.
27. Intake varied but was consistently down from the prior period when all charges were
indiscriminately docketed. In the first year of testing RCP in the three model offices, the
average reduction in charges received was 38%. See Percent Change in Charge Receipts(FY77-FY78) (EEOC chart on file at the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution). No
charges were rejected at intake without counselling and referral.
28. On-site investigation remained an option at the Commission's discretion, both to
seek and to verify information.
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C. The Justice Challenge
Is there a trade-off between the autonomy and satisfaction reported by
users of ADR2 9 and the procedural protect ion for parties associated with
traditional methods? This question needs both empirical investigation
and theoretical discussion. In putting the new system in place at the
EEOC, however, we had to assume that fairness issues would arise and
to include devices for assuring that RCP would effectively dispose of
them.
At a discrimination agency, justice for complainants, in particular, is a
central concern for two major reasons. First, the injustice and the histori-
cal.experiences associated with their status are the raisons d'etre for the
creation of the agency. Second, the statute embodies a strong public pol-
icy to eliminate discrimination experienced by individuals and groups
and deemed harmful to society. Title VII does not provide parties with
their own counsel at the initial stages of the process because the Com-
mission is charged with performing the necessary investigatory and ad-
vice functions. At the EEOC, however, the employer representative could
afford a lawyer more often than the complainant, although both parties
generally appeared without lawyers.
In anticipation of disparities of power and resources between the par-
ties, the EEOC trained investigators to be proactive fact-finders and
charged them with assisting the parties in bringing out their version of
the facts and with protecting weak parties against others who might have
more experience, resources, or assistance. At the same time, lawyers who
might accompany respondents"0 (or, more rarely, complainants) did not
participate in the fact-finding session, although they could whisper ad-
vice to their clients. This limitation was necessary to keep the fact-find-
ing conference from becoming a formal adversarial proceeding neither
contemplated nor authorized by Title VII. In that case, the fact-finding
conference would have enlarged the respondent's rights (the party most
likely to have a lawyer) rather than maintaining them as they would
have been had the Commission done the traditional paper or on-site in-
vestigation. Thus, without changing the character of the new process, the
parties retained the right to consult counsel inside or outside the room
29. See, e.g., Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know about Court-Administered Arbi-
tration, 69 JUDICATURE J. 270, 276 (1986) (survey of litigant satisfaction in four jurisdic-
tions with significantly different rules showed "overwhelming majority" satisfied); See also
infra note 11.
30. Significantly, after RCP was put into effect, company representatives reported that
their experience with the process soon led them to send the appropriate personnel without
lawyers, an expense they no longer felt necessary in light of the factual orientation of the
process.
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analogous to their right to consult counsel before answering questions
submitted by way of written interrogatories in the traditional investiga-
tory process.
The fact-finder was trained to play multiple roles. She was a neutral
who controlled the process, a helper to the party needing assistance, and
a mediator when settlement appeared possible. 1 Where appropriate, the
fact-finder acted as a helper as a judge might if a party appeared pro se
and the other side had counsel. This might mean drawing out facts that
the complainant might overlook or restraining the actions of the respon-
dent or her lawyer. At the same time, the fact-finder's function paral-
leled that of a mediator to help the parties reach an agreement. At the
EEOC, this meant encouraging settlement, the mode of resolution pre-
ferred by the statute,32 and as it turns out, the only practical method for
a complaint system that receives tens of thousands of cases each year.
The fact-finder's role as a mediator most directly raises the question of
justice in informal processes. The EEOC fact-finder was more than a
facilitator; she was an activist encouraging an agreement in keeping with
the facts, the applicable law, and the obligation of fairness to both par-
ties. In encouraging settlement, the fact-finder necessarily characterized
the evidence or the law based on her experience with similar factual situ-
ations and familiarity with the applicable precedents. This role carries
the risk that the mediator may unfairly influence the outcome.
The activist mediator in encouraging settlement may be perceived as
pressing settlement on an unwilling party.3 3 However, the reality of the
31. In an evaluation of RCP, the GAO characterized the EEOC fact-finder as a "mod-
erator/advisor." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
EEOC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 8 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 GAO Report].
32. See supra note 20.
33. See W. URY, GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED, supra note 1, at 162. These authors say
that, whatever its validity, this perception is "inevitable" in mediation, and they report that
despite the successful use of their preferred method, grievance mediation, there was occa-
sional criticism concerning pressure by mediators. This parallels the EEOC experience. The
GAO recommended that the EEOC find "no cause" rather than encourage the settlement
of inherently weak cases. The EEOC objected in its response that to avoid undermining the
statute, such "no cause" findings could not be made without extended investigation of weak
cases. Otherwise, the EEOC would be giving conclusive and unilateral weight to employers'
claims, because they usually possess the relevant information, while the employee can ob-
tain similar information only over a more extended time through investigative mechanisms.
The Office of Management and Budget, also responding in the GAO Report, recommended
more aggressive development of information prior to the fact-finding conference rather
than refusing to settle weak cases. 1981 GAO Report, supra note 31, at ii, 64, 75. One of
the most important factors influencing settlement is the huge number of cases that the
EEOC receives every year. Despite a growing caseload that had reached 115,000 charges
by 1987 the EEOC adopted a policy of fully investigating every case. The GAO found that
in light of the volume of cases, this policy led investigators to systematically close cases
without full investigation and to a doubling of the backlog between 1983 and 1987. GEN-
ERAl. ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO REQUESTER, EEOC AND STATE AGENCIES DID
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settlement dynamic in rights controversies, where claimants look to law
or unionized employees to contracts, for example, is that resolution often
is unlikely without frank assessments among the parties and the media-
tor. This should be a professional assessment, including the mediator's
experience with similar matters and their outcomes. This role for the
mediator is especially vital when the mediator is a government agency
who, in facilitating agreements between individuals, is also carrying out
an important public policy, A party should not be deprived of the neces-
sary knowledge and assistance because she does not have a lawyer. The
statutory role of the Commission is to investigate cases and guide the
parties so that a lawyer-is unnecessary. To carry out this role, the Com-
mission fact-finder often helped the parties to evaluate the evidence in
light of the settlement offered, especially questions of regal sufficiency
and precedents involving similar facts.
For discrimination claims, in particular, whatever the actual facts or
their legal effect, individuals who go so far as to file a formal complaint
to assert what they believe to be their rights often do so with a feeling of
entitlement or of personal violation. Respondents, whose view of the facts
may be quite different, often adopt a defensive deep-pockets posture that
assumes that an action has been brought because of their putative power
or economic position. This is a recipe for deadlock.
In the event of a formal disposition, presumably the matter would be
decided with the winner taking all. However, experience teaches that the
chances for complainants to prevail in small individual discrimination
cases is relatively slim because statutory discrimination is a circum-
scribed concept, because'the evidence is usually circumstantial and elu-
sive, and because the burden is on the complainant, who almost always
has fewer resources and less power. 34 Even when the-proceeding is placed
in an agency with subpoena power and the facilities to investigate and
bring out the facts, both the burden and the legal standard are un-
changed, and both are likely to raise more difficulties, for the challenger
than for the respondent. At the EEOC the, fact-finder met the concern
for fairness in two ways- first by encouraging the free flow of informa-
tion to maximize the discovery of facts that otherwise might be delayed
or withheld (especially by the employer, who typically possesses most of
the applicable records and documents); and then by conversations with
NoT FULLY INVESTIGATE CHARGES 2. 3 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 GAO Report]. See arso
infra note 39.
34. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)(respondent
need only articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for action .while claimant retains
the burden of persuasion).
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both parties concerning their rights and prospects in accordance with the
evidence.
The fact-finding conference brought out the information on which
each party based his view of the case. This process almost always pro-
duced new knowledge that in more formal proceedings or investigations
might have been withheld for some time and obtained later only at the
cost of time and resources. The old process, which featured formal paper
investigations, often required repeated demands for information from
employers and culminated in subpoena proceedings in court.3 5 Fact-find-
ing, on the other hand, was a face-to-face process that required that doc-
uments be physically produced at the fact-finding conference. Moreover,
fact-finding, by clarifying matters otherwise known only to one party,
often reduced the number of issues early, altering to one degree or the
other the rigidity of the parties' initial stance.
In a typical case, suppose a man is promoted rather than a woman,
despite her good performance evaluations. At the fact-finding conference,
she learns for the first time that the man, whose qualifications appear
marginally inferior to hers, received the promotion because his attend-
ance and lateness record is superior. Her attendance and lateness record
is not unsatisfactory but is more spotty, and close supervision of the em-
ployees in the unit is an important job-related qualification. At this
stage, the evidence does not favor the complainant. Nevertheless, she is
entitled to further investigation of her complaint because she is alleging
unequal treatment, and deeper information from the employer would re-
veal whether, for example, men with attendance and punctuality records
similar to hers had been promoted to this or similar jobs in the past. The
employer would be obligated to produce a second and more elaborate set
of records to satisfy this next investigatory step.
Thus far, fact-finding has demonstrated to both parties the major
strengths and weaknesses of their positions. The facts produced have led
both to understand that they might have something to lose if the matter
goes further. Without a showing that men have not been held to the
same standard and that therefore the lateness and attendance defense is
a pretext, the complainant would be unlikely to prevail. On the other
hand, even if the employer is reasonably sure that there was no disparate
treatment, she would be put to the trouble of producing records and re-
ports on perhaps many workers in order to show that she did not discrim-
inate against one. Thus, fact-finding alone often may bring the parties to
35. Resort to subpoenas usually comes after considerable time has been spent seeking to
obtain the requested information voluntarily. If the respondent raises objections to produc-
ing requested material or the subpoena is ignored, EEOC must initiate enforcement pro-
ceedings in court, introducing the "law's delay". See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9.
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desire settlement based on an intelligent assessment of the facts and of
the risks to each.
The more controversial aspect of the process comes in a second step
involving mediation when settlement appears appropriate. In the EEOC
process, active intervention often was necessary to help both parties, who
were usually novices, come to grips with the information they had discov-
ered in order to evaluate its strength in light of similarly situated facts
and precedents.36 In formal legal proceedings, such evaluations by the
parties occur as the evidence is developed, with the result that in the
great majority of cases, the parties either drop the matter or choose a
settlement that they fashion rather than go to judgment by a neutral. 37
The transaction costs incurred in disputes, along with the uncertainty
of outcome, act as powerful incentives to settle. At the EEOC, the re-
spondent, usually a business, has an interest in reducing transaction costs
and avoiding liability. The complainant risks an unfavorable outcome,
and in the cost-free administrative process, incurs transaction costs in
delayed or missed opportunities because of the necessity to pursue a rem-
edy and because of the legal hurdles and delay that result. The Commis-
sion, a tax supported agency, bears the transaction costs of processing
cases and is under pressure to resolve increasing numbers of individual
complaints as well as to undertake class actions. Consequently, the fail-
ure to process cases in a timely and effective way and the growth of an
enormous backlog had hurt complainants, respondents, and the Commis-
sion itself and had discouraged others from coming forward to file
complaints.
However, more was required than making the complaint process effi-
cient.38 Although inefficiency often had foreclosed fairness, efficiency
36. Because most parties do not have lawyers, the Commission is under a special duty to
help them understand the evidence and the legal standards by which it must be judged. For
example, in the hypotheticals used here, it may be necessary to explain why promptness
and attendance are job-related qualifications in judging competence for promotion, why
success would be very difficult if it were shown that the men previously promoted had
similarly good time and attendance records, or why it is more difficult to establish discrimi-
nation when the complainant and respondent are of the same race. In general, studies show
better outcomes when mediators "identify and sharpen issues and propose agendas, trying
to get people to engage with the issues in a productive way." Researchers Interviewed-
What We Know-And Don't Know-About Mediation, DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM 9, 10
(Oct. 1989) (Dean G. Pruitt, researcher interviewed).
37. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN. THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO RESOLVING LEGAL DIS-
PUTES: BETTER RESULTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 6-7 (1985).
38. Reported evidence of efficiency, without discussion of fairness, may encourage skep-
ticism of ADR from those whose professional training, background, or experience leads
them to doubt that less formal processes can render justice. As a tax-supported agency of
the federal government, the EEOC felt an obligation to closely monitor and to regularly
report on the functioning of the process and on the details of the results under the new
system, as well as on additional steps taken toward improvement. Public confidence that
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would not in itself produce fairness in a mass complaint system.39 Never-
theless, the characteristics and goals of the complaint process of a dis-
crimination agency suggested that fairness of outcome and efficiency of
process were linked. This could be demonstrated by reference to three
factors: processing time, remedy, and the release of resources to further
unattended statutory obligations. The processing time as a proxy for effi-
ciency, and the remedy as a proxy for fairness compared with the same
indicators under the old system provided one way to assess the link. A
relationship between fairness and efficiency also would exist if new
processing methods released resources to meet statutory responsibilities
to unserved victims and classes of discrimination.
Processing time, the number of days or months it took to resolve cases,
was the obvious proxy for efficiency. An increase in the remedy rate and
in dollar benefits provided a reasonable measure of fairness to both par-
ties under the circumstances. The existing remedy rate was so low4" that
it was inconsistent with the statutory assumption that discrimination was
widespread. Thus, the overwhelming foreclosure of remedies to com-
plainants appeared to be unfair. An increase in remedies would indicate
that the system was fairer than before when employers almost always
prevailed."1 Moreover, as I explain in Section II1, an increase in reme-
had been eroded by years of backlog could be restored only by documented evidence that
the new procedures were producing improvements. The morale of a staff that had taken the
brunt of public resentment could be restored only by evidence that a workable system was
in place. Questions of fairness that streamlined procedures might disadvantage complain-
ants could be put to rest only by timely evaluation of case results.
39. Investigations of the EEOC during most of the decade of the 1980's reported not
only a return to inefficient case processing methods but also to a bifurcation between effi-
ciency and fairness. Performance indicators were not tied to quality of results, such as
percentage of claimants benefitted, as with RCP, but to numbers of cases closed. Official
investigations reported that the focus on efficiency alone produced cases that were incom-
pletely and incompetently investigated, yielding few remedies for complainants. See gener-
ally 1988 GAO Report, supra note 33. Inadequate investigations resulted in large part
from pressure investigators felt to reduce case inventory. Id. at 3, 31-32. By 1986 the no
cause rate for complainants' cases had risen to 59% from 32.1% in 1980, when RCP was
used. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. EEOC BIRMINGHAM OFFICE CLOSED
DISCRIMINATION CHARGES WITHOUT FULL INVESTIGATION (July 1987); See also Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 114-18 (1983) (testimony of Nancy Kreiter, Women Em-
ployed). In addition, the backlog of cases climbed significantly. In 1986, the Commission
had a 6 1,000 case backlog. Hearing on Clarence Thomas of Missouri to be Chairman of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Hearings before the Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 79 n.157 (1986). Compare infra
note 44.
40. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 21.
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dies at a saving in time and money to employers was consistent with the
interests of employers in fairness.42
Changes in remedies and case processing time demonstrated that the
new process had a measurable effect on the justice of the results.43 Be-
tween 1976 (when the old system was in piace) and 1980, the settlement
rate, the effective remedy rate, tripled from fourteen percent to forty-
three percent, the average dollar benefit to complainants more than
doubled from $1400 to $3400 and the case processing time decreased
from 24 months to 140 days.44 Further, by the fall of 1981, the Backlog
Charge Processing System had reduced the backlog by more the 100,000
cases.
45
The dividends went well beyond early treatment of individual cases
and backlog reduction. RCP allowed the EEOC to pursue justice in ways
that had been foreclosed or delayed earlier by inefficiency. A greater
number of individuals with complaints could be served. Equally impor-
tant, with individual charges no longer claiming a disproportionate share
of the Commission's resources, the EEOC was able to pursue class ac-
tions in a systematic way for the first time. A separate Systematic
Charge Processing System was instituted, and 500 class charges were
42. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
43. Before placing RCP in all its offices, the Commission tested the system in three
model offices in Baltimore, Chicago, and Houston, diverse locations chosen to examine the
effectiveness and replicability of the procedures under different conditions. First year re-
sults in the model offices showed a 65% increase in productivity with 96% more cases
resolved than in the prior year, 133% more cases resolved than received, and an average
processing time of 65 days. Dollar benefits to charging parties quadrupled from $1.0 mil-
lion in 1977 to $4.2 million in 1978, and the number of complainants who received mone-
tlry remedies through RCP more than tripled, from 691 to 2,523. Statement of Eleanor
Holmes Norton before the Subcomm. on State, Justice, Commerce and the Judiciary of
t4e Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R. 4392, pt. 2, March
19, 1979, p. 1497.
44. Federal Enforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity Laws: Hearings before-the
Subcomm. on Equal Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 114-18 (1983) (testimony of Nancy Kreiter, Women Em-
ployed). See also 1981 GAO report, supra note 31, at 4-7.
1977 1980
Percentage of Settlements 14 47
Benefits (Monetary) 3,948,006 43,082,000
Number of people benefitted 2,007 29,251
Time for processing 2 years 140 days
Letter of Eleanor Holmes Norton to Gregory J. Ahart, Director of Human Resources,
GAO, 1981 GAO Report 61 [hereinafter Norton letter, 1981 GAO Report].
45. Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action,
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Equal Employment Opportunities of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 336 (1981)(statement of J. Clay Smith, Jr.,
Acting Chairperson, EEOC).
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filed by 1980.48 An even larger number of class actions derived from
individual charges were filed annually. 47 While individual cases will al-
ways be important, class actions are the primary tool for eliminating the
phenomenon of discrimination, including the patterns that ensnare large
numbers of people and that often feed the atmosphere that produces in-
dividual acts of discrimination as well.4 Individual cases are rarely po-
tent enough to effect these patterns.
The RCP reforms introduced a more efficient and more remedy-bear-
ing method of resolving cases, leaving the traditional case processing sys-
tem for cases that required an extended investigation, a cause finding,
conciliation, and, in appropriate instances, a court suit. At the same
time, the newly inserted process represented an acknowledgement of the
reality that the existing undifferentiated system could not provide the
necessary choices for resolution that the range of cases demanded. The
results showed an improvement in efficiency, measured by reduction in
case processing time and in backlog reduction, as well as greater fairness
or justice, measured by the increase in remedies to complainants and the
release of resources to additional individual cases and to broad-scale ini-
tiatives against discrimination.
Ill. THE UNDERLYING INTEREST IN JUSTICE
Significant differences in the structure, characteristics, and purposes of
dispute processes cannot be accommodated if monolithic criteria are
46. EEOC, Update/ 1980 (EEOC document on file at the Ohio State Journal on Dispute
Resolution).
47. The Commission established two routes for bringing class action charges, one for
large Commission-initiated charges brought through the Systematic Charge Processing
System and another for class actions that came to the attention of the Commission through
charges filed by individuals. The latter program, called Early Litigation Identification
(ELI), greatly accelerated class action work. Between April 1979, when the program was
initiated and September 30, 1979, there were 636 active ELIs. 1981 GAO Report supra
note 31, at 10.
48. The importance of the class action mission was discussed in a U.S. Office of Person-
nel Management evaluation of the EEOC reforms: "In 1971, when Congress amended Ti-
tle VII ... it set [as] a high priority for EEOC's enforcement efforts as (sic) an attack on
patterns and systematic discrimination activities in society. Now that the Commission has
made remarkable progress in reducing backlog and refining procedures for timely resolving
current individual charges, it is able to establish programs to meet the above high priority."
L. W. TAYLOR & L. S. TAO, MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES AND EEOC's IMPROVED PRODUC-
TIVITY 13 (Jan. 1981) (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Case Management Informa-
tion Series. keport No. I). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also studied the
RCP and backlog reduction procedures. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET.
MANAGEMENT SUCCESSES AND IMPROVEMENTS: Two CASE EXAMPLES 1 (1980): "These
chang,' have led to greatly improved performance. . . [which] should be of special interest
to other agencies with responsibilities for investigating complaints from the public . ..."
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used to evaluate fairness. An interest-based analysis of outcomes that
systematically focuses on whether the recognizable interests of parties
are served provides a way to test the quality of justice of some dispute
systems.
The evidence from RCP suggests that a consistency between improved
efficiency and increase in remedies was achieved. Case processing time
was significantly reduced while the dollar benefits received and the per-
centage of complainants benefitted were substantially raised. 9 Employ-
ers cooperated with a system that greatly increased the number of com-
plainants who received settlements and more than doubled the average
dollar amount they paid to complainants." An interest analysis explains
why the parties were willing to settle. A similar analysis can help answer
the deeper question of whether justice was done.
In a dispute concerning rights, an employer and employee typically
appear to have few interests in common. Their respective interests in jus-
tice would appear especially polarized. However, the usual contrast be-
tween opposing sides is mediated by the strong public policy that sup-
ports the elimination of discrimination through the vindication of
individual rights in an administrative process structured to prefer settle-
ment and conciliation. In this context, at least three common interests
can be isolated as components of justice. They are an interest in effi-
ciency; an interest in vindication, which is the tangible evidence that jus-
tice has been done; and an interest in reducing the risk of losinp the case
altogether. In reforming its approach to case processing in 1977, the
EEOC sought to satisfy these interests.
First, experience had taught both complainants and respono1ents that
they had a mutual interest in efficiency through timely processing. Com-
plainants were almost always unsuccessful when their complaints were
allowed to age." Thus, delay alone contributed greatly to unjust results
for complainants. Employers prevailed overwhelmingly in cases under
the old system but incurred large transaction costs "paid" not to com-
plainants but to the complaint processing system in the cost of producing
numerous rounds of data, the use of supervisory and other personnel in
that effort, lawyers' fees, and other costs associated with remaining for
inordinate periods of time in the EEOC process. Delay and backlog
therefore punished both parties in measurable terms, left each believing
49. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. Almost two-thirds of negotiated set-
tlements included monetary relief, but other forms of relief, such as a neutral reference or
expungement of records may have been even more valuable. See Norton letter, 1981 GAO
Report, supra note 44.
50. See Norton letter, 1981 GAO Report, supra note 44.
51. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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that the process had failed as a justice system, and produced a mutual
interest in timely processing.
Second, each party has an interest in vindication in some form because
vindication translates into justice, particularly in discrimination cases.
These cases are often inherently volatile not only on the merits, but also
because of the long and troubled history of discrimination in this coun-
try. A complainant believing himself to be a victim of discrimination is
likely to feel a deep need for vindication. An employer, wary of the possi-
ble effects of the accusation and confident of her judgment, is likely to
feel a reciprocal need. As a result each seeks affirmation from the pro-
cess. However, if the process proceeds to conclusion, only one party can
prevail, and the interest of the other in vindication will be defeated. The
high value that each attaches to vindication-or justice-therefore
heightens the aversion to the risk that the claimant will be found to have
been an unworthy employee rather than a victim of discrimination or
that the employer will be found to have violated the statute.
Third, because both parties attach critical importance to vindication,
they have a mutual interest in risk avoidance. Discrimination is difficult
for the complainant to prove because the motives and actions of the re-
spondent are seldom directly apparent. This heightens the risk to the
complainant. However, before a definitive finding in favor of the respon-
dent may be issued, the Commission must engage in the usual eviden-
tiary methodology for testing the presence or absence of discrimination. 2
This increases the risk to the respondent.
Without a settlement, therefore, each party assumes the risk that she
will not prevail in the case, a risk most parties desire to avoid. Moreover,
this desire is consistent with the statutory mandate that prefers settle-
ment to litigation and thus requires attempts to conciliate discrimination
matters before litigation may be brought.63 Even when Title VII cases
are brought in court, the great majority do not go to judgment but are
negotiated and settled out of court or through consent decrees.
A settlement that meets the parties' interests in timely processing, in
vindication, and in risk avoidance is a just one, even though the parties
do not have the same subjective interests. For complainants, RCP
achieved a just result because it provided satisfactory vindication in a
reasonable time period in a jurisdiction in which the necessary proof is
52. See McDonnell Douglass v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (explaining the structure of
proof for prima facie case of intentional discrimination).
53. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Even when discrimination
agencies have full enforcement power, as the EEOC does not, they must usually attempt
some form of voluntary settlement before proceeding to a formal adverserial hearing. See.
e.g.. N.Y. HUIA, RIGrls LAW § 297 (McKinney 1985).
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elusive in the typical case. For employers, RCP provided a just solution
because it resolved the complaints they had been winning in any case in
an efficient and less costly way and avoided a finding of liability in
others. In terms that could be measured-settlement rate and dollars for
complainants, reduced transaction costs and an avoidance of a formal
finding for respondents, and reduced processing time for both, the
variated complaint system rendered a quality of justice superior to the
one-dimensional traditional administrative process.
CONCLUSION
Nonfunctional dispute systems continue to be widely accepted in the
United States. The toll that process conservatism takes on the quality of
justice rendered by such systems needs investigation and analysis. An
efficiency analysis of dispute systems is often done today. We know how
to count the cases in court and administrative agency backlogs, how to
assess case processing time, and how to figure transaction costs. Assess-
ing the quality of justice, however, is not only more difficult; it is inher-
ently problematic. The elements of a just system beyond the presence of
due process mechanisms have not been systematically explored.
The EEOC used three crtiteria to assess whether the Rapid Charge
Processing System, its alternative to traditional complaint processing,
rendered justice. These were whether the interests or the parties in jus-
tice were met; whether the efficiencies of RCP released resources to com-
mit to more broad scale efforts to reduce discrimination; and whether
RCP enabled the Commission to process the complaints of still more in-
dividual complainants without accumulating backlog. Substantial im-
provements in the remedy rate and case processing time met the interest
of complainants in justice. Reduction in transaction costs and time and
avoidance of a formal finding met the interest of respondents in justice.
The release of resources for class action work and for processing the
complaints of others, who under the old system might have been hurt by
delays in the process, met the needs of the unserved public as well as the
public policy or larger justice goals of the statute.
In a discrimination case processing system, which must handle tens of
thousands of individual cases a year, settlements that benefit complain-
ants are a reasonable trade-off for a reduction in transaction costs to the
employer; this calculation assures that cases are not simply closed in the
interest of efficiency without the appropriate concern for justice. This
trade-off is also fair to respondents, who understand the needs of their
own workplace or have lawyers to advise them concerning the risk of
liability and who are fully equipped to assess the appropriateness of the
trade-off and to protect themselves against unjust results. Employers rou-
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tinely engage in such calculations and overwhelmingly decide to settle
legal matters that arise in other aspects of their work.
Securing justice in dispute systems should not simply be an aspira-
tional ideal. Nor is it an automatic benefit of traditional dispute systems.
Justice, when viewed as a product of justice systems, is still largely an
imponderable of the mechanisms established to provide it. Justice is de-
bated, not defined. It is assumed to result from formal systems and sus-
pected of falling short in informal systems.
What is at stake is too important for such casual measures, assump-
tions, or suspicions. Driven by the growing pressure of the mounting vol-
ume and complexity of matters, first alternative methods, and now alter-
native systems are being developed. These alternatives may sometimes be
more efficient and less costly, but little is known about the justice they
presumably are established to render. Equally important, too much is
assumed about the quality of the justice rendered by inefficient tradi-
tional systems. At bottom is the question of whether due process alone is
a sufficient guarantee of justice when the justice mechanism itself is
highly inefficient or essentially nonfunctional. The absence of generic
measures or other criteria for assessing the quality of justice does not
relieve us of the obligation to develop measures that fit the particular
systems in use, whether formal or informal.
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